


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
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South Vietnam: Increased enemy activity was reported from many areas of South Vietnam. The Communists appeared to be continuing their strategy of steady pressure against allied military forces and installations.

In the delta, Viet Cong gunners shelled the key US base at Dong Tam, killing two Americans, wounding 64, and destroying several hundred tons of ammunition. Elsewhere in IV Corps, a captured document indicates that the Communist force which clashed with US units in Kien Phong Province on 23-24 March was a Viet Cong battalion. Enemy units of this size are seldom encountered in this region.

Ground fighting picked up sharply in the provinces northeast and northwest of Saigon, and the enemy kept up widely scattered rocket and mortar attacks against allied military positions. One of the major engagements was in Long Khanh Province, where regimental elements of the Viet Cong 5th Division attacked two allied Special Forces battalions.

In Tay Ninh Province, a North Vietnamese battalion attempted to ambush a US Army supply convoy and an unknown Communist unit was engaged by allied Special Forces. Throughout the III Corps area at least 20 rocket and mortar attacks were reported. In Saigon, there was a moderate increase in terrorist activity, with three incidents taking place.

The pattern of enemy action in II Corps is unchanged, with shelling and occasional ground fighting in the western highlands and some instances of terrorism in the coastal provinces. Enemy mortar and rocket crews were active throughout the provinces of I Corps, shelling Quang Tri and Quang Ngai cities and several allied military bases. Ground clashes occurred southwest of Da Nang and Con Thien, with Communist forces reportedly taking heavy losses. (Map)

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Pakistan: The imposition of martial law has been greeted with calm and acquiescence throughout the country and with considerable relief in many parts of West Pakistan.

The transition is apparently being accomplished smoothly. Urban areas in both East and West Pakistan are quiet, with few troops in evidence and daily life near normal. Reactions from rural areas have not yet filtered into the cities. Few newspapers have thus far carried editorial comment, and opposition leaders have eschewed public statements. The prospects for continued calm are uncertain, however.

In his brief nationwide broadcast yesterday, chief martial law administrator Yahya Khan urged the people to cooperate with his regime and warned that agitational and destructive activities would not be tolerated. He emphasized that his sole intention is to bring the country "back to sanity" and restore conditions conducive to the establishment of a constitutional government. He gave no hint of when he expected this to be accomplished.

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UK-Anguilla: Lord Caradon, the UK representative to the UN, and a senior official from London are being sent to Anguilla to review the situation.

One of their main tasks will be to consider how to handle Ronald Webster, the self-proclaimed spokesman for the island, with whom the British have not yet come to terms. The British believe that he has been gaining support in what he calls "the struggle against St. Kitts" and that none of the moderates will be able to displace him so long as he succeeds in convincing the Anguillans that St. Kitts, rather than the UK, is the main enemy.

London is not optimistic about an early settlement. Foreign Secretary Stewart this week cautioned Parliament that it would take some time to find a satisfactory solution.

Meanwhile, Britain has begun to withdraw some paratroopers. They will be replaced by a Royal Engineers unit which will handle internal security problems and work on development projects for the island.

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South Korea: Hard-line supporters of President Pak are quietly continuing to work for early action on a constitutional amendment to allow him to run for a third term in 1971.

Despite Pak's decision last month to defer open action on the controversial amendment until the end of the year, the head of his intelligence service has developed a new, shortened timetable for changing the constitution, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The plan calls for adoption of the amendment by the government party in June, National Assembly action beginning in September, and final enactment by the end of the year.

Pak vetoed the initial plans of his hard-line supporters for early action on the amendment in order to allow time for overcoming opposition both within the government party and among the general public. His intelligence chief, however, appears convinced, despite indications to the contrary, that public opposition is not a serious obstacle and that the problem is largely one of winning over critics within the regime.

President Pak probably has not approved the new timetable, although he may be aware of it. There is no indication that the hard-liners have as yet had any success in overcoming resistance within the regime to their plans, and Pak is unlikely to commit himself until he is assured of near unanimous party support. Maneuvering within the regime between his hard-line supporters, the moderates, and outright opponents of the amendment is likely to intensify, and Pak will become increasingly hard pressed to control the infighting. [REDACTED]

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
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USSR: The Soviets yesterday orbited a weather satellite which may be intended as a replacement for the only other Soviet operational weather satellite.

The latest satellite joins Cosmos 226--launched last June--which had a longer than average life for a Soviet weather satellite. Recent evidence suggests, however, that the useful lifetime of Cosmos 226 may have ended.



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Soviet performance under the exchange program with the US may continue to be poor, even if an improved satellite is launched, because data-handling facilities on the ground are apparently limited.



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South Africa: Despite Prime Minister Vorster's firm control over the ruling Nationalist Party, he still has not been able to bring his extreme right-wing critics to heel.

Intraparty squabbling arose again this week, largely as a result of criticism by the "verkrampte," or ultra-right, wing of the Nationalist Party over Vorster's so-called "outward looking" foreign policy, which is intended to help South Africa improve its relations with the black African states. Despite the wide disparity of living standards between the whites and non-whites in South Africa, many "verkramptes" also argued that under the current application of apartheid policies the government is doing too much for the black citizens.

During a Nationalist Party rally late last week, the prime minister once again adjured the ultra-rightists--particularly those in the press--to fall in line behind his policies. Subsequently, the Transvaal branch of the party, considered the most conservative of the four provincial party units, has been holding caucus meetings all week in a heavy-handed attempt to get party stalwarts to sign a statement repudiating the right-wing critics. The "verkramptes" who refuse to sign may face expulsion from the party.

There is little doubt that Vorster has the overwhelming support of the party, and through such intensive pressures will succeed in tightening party control over the "verkramptes." At the same time, acquiescence in party discipline by the "verkramptes" may be only an expedient which will merely delay the final showdown, which Vorster will ultimately win.

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Senegal: A strike launched Tuesday by lycee students in Dakar and several other major cities could presage another round of agitation.

The lycee students, who are protesting the government's alleged failure to make scholarship payments and its tough line toward strikers at an agricultural school in the interior, have been soliciting support for their cause. Members of the radical Dakar University student organization that sparked last spring's student and labor crisis have thus far refused to give requested assistance, but apparently they are prepared to join the protest if the government attempts to repress the strike. The university students are probably reluctant to jeopardize upcoming negotiations on university reform.

25X1 [redacted] the national labor union bureau met Monday night and, in a heatedly antigovernment atmosphere, adopted a position supporting the "legitimate" demands of the students. 25X1 [redacted] a general strike by the end of the week was likely.

The government clearly hopes to prevent the coalescence of Senegal's many disaffected groups into a unified front. Officials met Tuesday with representatives of labor, parents, and economic organizations to discuss the situation. If other groups do not jump quickly to the dissidents' support, President Senghor will probably try to buy off the strikers with concessions to their demands. Although this tactic has worked successfully in past disputes, his ability to offer financial assistance will be limited by the government's increasingly severe budgetary difficulties. 25X1 [redacted]

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Mozambique: The defection of a key Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) leader could split the principal tribal element in Mozambique's only significant nationalist group.

Lazaro Nkavandame, the FRELIMO political chief in northeastern Mozambique--the one area where FRELIMO has remained relatively strong--defected to the Portuguese on 16 March. He has agreed to cooperate with them in trying to wean his fellow Makonde tribesmen from FRELIMO and in military operations against FRELIMO forces.

The Makonde tribal structure has been the basis of the FRELIMO apparatus in that area, and the warlike tribesmen have provided most of FRELIMO's guerrillas. They have become increasingly dissatisfied with their role in FRELIMO, however. Nkavandame was the sole Makonde on the FRELIMO central committee.

The ultimate value of Nkavandame to Portuguese counterinsurgency efforts is unclear. In any event, FRELIMO's unity has been badly strained and the leadership may be unable to prevent further deterioration.

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Turkey: Labor contract talks between Turkish unions and the local US military logistical contractor are approaching the 28 March deadline. If no agreement is reached by then, a strike could begin soon afterward and seriously hamper US military housekeeping and base support activities in Turkey. Similar disputes have been settled in the past, usually with the aid of the Turkish Government, but a solution may be harder to find this time.

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